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Abstract 
One of the basic socio-economic problems is the problem of distribution of benefits and dues. The historically shaped 
principles of justice direct the solution to the problem of the Aristotelian rule of proportionality. But applying this 
rule not always gives the expected, satisfactory solutions. This occurs, for instance, regarding the allocation of seats 
among the member states in the European Parliament. For this reason, the principle of degressive proportionality was 
legitimized. Although the definition appears in the context of the European Parliament, the application of the rule 
distribution may be much wider due to certain universal priorities it embodies. The principle of degressive 
proportionality, however, has a significant drawback, namely, it does not clearly provide a exact division. This lack 
of clarity results in the fact that within the rule there may appear many different proposals. The article is an attempt to 
evaluate some of the proposals by the criterion of drawing nearer the most, under certain assumptions, degressively 
proportional allocation to the proportional one and proposing rules for determining the boundary conditions for such 
allocation.  
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of JIBES University 
Jakarta Indonesia.   
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1. Introduction 
The division of property most commonly used in practice is derived from Aristotle principle of 
proportional allocation. It is unambiguous, and only in the case of indivisible goods there remains a 
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problem of rounding the obtained values to integers. The solution to this problem can be found in many 
electoral regulations in force in the past and present. Numerous studies in this area, especially by 
American politicians, lived to see the formal rules and act as the legal standards which serve as the key to 
the distribution of seats in collegial bodies (Young, 2003). 
Proportions of representation shall be set as nearly always in accordance with an aspect ratio of the 
population under the respective constituencies. It turns out that for large disparities in the population of 
the principle of proportional allocation does not work. In such a situation it may happen that the smallest 
districts, with some methods of rounding the actual proportions to integer numbers, will be deprived of 
representation. Such a situation is the case, for example, in the current demographic structure of countries 
in the  European Union. Some of the known methods of proportional allocation used in the distribution of 
seats in European Parliament would deprive Malta of any representation. This means that not always the 
principle of proportional division leads to the desired results. Therefore, in some cases one must also 
apply the solutions different from the classical rules of Aristotle (Lasier, 2012). 
2. Degressive proportionality 
The principle of degressive proportionality has been legally sanctioned in the art. Paragraph 9a. 2 of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Not wanting to deprive the least populated country, which is Malta, of its 
representation at the collegiate body it was decided to move away from proportional in relation to 
population, manner of allocating seats (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2010): The European Parliament shall be 
composed of representatives of the Union's citizens. They shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty in 
number, plus the President. Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum 
threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six 
seats. 
Guidelines for the understanding degressive proportionality can be found in the annex to the draft of 
resolution the European Parliament (Lamassoure, Severin, 2007). The rules include in it clarify the idea 
contained in the Treaty. The first of them, the principle of fair distribution is that a country with a larger 
number of people cannot get less seats than less populated country. The second, defined as the principle 
of relative proportionality, states that the bigger the country, the greater number of voters should its 
member of Parliament represent. 
Taking this into account it can be concluded that the sequence s1, s2, , sn is degressively proportional 
with respect to p1, p2, , pn if and only if:  
if        p1 p2 pn,        then     s1 s2  sn,                                                                    (1) 
and 







.                                                                 (2)  
This is clearly not the only formulation of the definition of degressive proportionality. The terms of the 
Treaty of Lisbon also allow for other possibilities for understanding this concept (Florek, 2012; yko, 
2012), but the definition presented above is most common in the literature. 
The said resolution also contains additional guidance concerning the distribution of seats between the 
Member States of the European Union. Inter alia, it stipulates that: The minimum and maximum 
numbers set by the Treaty must be fully utilised to ensure that the allocation of seats in the European 
Parliament reflects as closely as possible the range of populations of the Member States.  
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Given this recommendation, one should look for solutions among those that degressively 
proportionately divide the number of seven hundred and fifty or seven hundred fifty-one seats in such a 
way that so that the smallest country received six, and the largest ninety-six seats. 
3. Proposed divisions 
Of course, conditions that were formulated in this way do not guarantee the unambiguity of the 
division. For this reason one introduces, explicitly or not, in any concrete proposals for solutions 
additional criteria to eliminate or minimize ambiguities. In the literature there are a number of proposals 
of such criteria leading to different allocations of seats in European Parliament. Because of the wording 
used in the Treaty authors divide H = 750 or H = 751 seats. 
Most natural way of the degressively proportional allocation of seats that takes into account the given 
boundary conditions is the use of integer linear programming methods (Serafini, 2012). Another approach 
is the use of spline methods (Ramirez et al, 2012). Finally, the next similar methods are the ones proposed 
by Ramirez (Ramirez et al, 2006) and Pukelsheim (Pukelsheim, 2007). They use a classic shift of 
proportionality and sticking in order to provide allocations that meet all of the boundary conditions. The 
results of these methods using the three classic rules of rounding to integers are given in the work of 
Misztal (Misztal, 2012a). 
Part of the proposal does not include recommendations for the allocations to achieve the boundary 
conditions described in the Treaty. It is then said that in the place of equality there occur appropriate 
inequalities, recorded in the art. 9a. Among these allocations it is worth to mention an allocation created 
on the basis of the principle of reverse recursion (Misztal, 2012b), or an allocation that meets the demand 
for demographic stability ( yko et al, 2010). 
4. The boundary conditions  
Determining the smallest and largest number of allocated seats itself generates a certain degression of 
the division. Indeed, denoting by m and M, respectively, the lowest and highest number of seats one 
determines at the same time smallest and largest number of voters represented by one Member of 
Parliament. These are the pm  and PM , where p = pn, and P = p1. Condition (2) of the definition of 
degressive proportionality says that for every 1 < i < n, i
i
p




M ), therefore 
assuming that the degression of the allocation is merely a consequence of boundary conditions one shall 
map the structure of the pi proportionally on the si. This solution seems to be very objective. Only the 
requirements of the smallest and largest number of seats are assumed and further construction is generally 
the consequence of adopting an undisputed rule of proportional division. Therefore, the boundary 
conditions become the only controllable parameters in performing the allocation. 
The assumption of the proportional mapping of two intervals of different lengths implies the usage in 
the construction the theorem of Thales. The idea is to make the proportions in the section that represents 
the population the same as in the section presenting the allocated seats. Therefore, the problem boils 
down to defining the function of allocation. 
Aprop[p, P]  [m, M] having the property that Aprop(p) = m Aprop(P) = M and satisfying condition 
( )propA t m t p
M m P p
     for each      t  [p, P]. 
Transforming this equality, it is easy to see that the 
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A t m t p . 
What is more 
lim( ) ( ) ( )prop
M m
P p
P p p t t p P t
A t m t p m m M m A t
P p P p P p P p
. 
This function was considered in the work of S omczy ski and yczkowski (S omczy ski, yczkowski, 
2012). Therefore, the sequence A(p1), A(p2), ..., A(pn) is degressively proportional with respect to 
p1, p2, ..., pn, but it does not need to be a sequence whose elements are integers. According to the 
Cambridge Compromise it is sufficient that the proposed solution satisfies the condition of degressive 
proportionality before rounding to integers, so it may be a way to indicate the solution of the problem of 
allocation. 
But there remains the problem of satisfying the third boundary condition  that is ensuring that the sum 
of allocated seats equals H. In general,  
A(p1) + A(p2) + ... + A(pn) H 
and  
[A(p1)] + [A(p2)] + ... + [A(pn)] H, 
where[A(pi)] is a rounding to integers of the number A(pi). In particular, the current demographic structure 
of European Union member states is that, taking the population of the countries as a sequence pi, even 
after rounding up of the numbers A(pi) is the sum is less than 750.  
Table 1. Values of allocation function Aprop in the period 2006-2011  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
6,0703034 6,0751331 6,0808704 6,0881272 6,0969734 6,1042623 
6,3965078 6,4075185 6,4169311 6,4227782 6,4299135 6,4280329 
7,0309392 7,0269429 7,0238426 7,0223535 7,0237144 7,0208762 
7,7535833 7,7609101 7,7602057 7,7856356 7,8053591 7,8065201 
8,0730996 8,0586074 8,0469305 8,0381689 8,0280682 8,0050925 
9,2894696 9,271221 9,2520964 9,238972 9,2230845 9,1281949 
10,17251 10,290525 10,39072 10,452549 10,482404 10,496173 
11,32166 11,350245 11,379913 11,419172 11,459473 11,48589 
11,468235 11,478456 11,490492 11,513972 11,540748 11,55228 
11,510232 11,537184 11,572775 11,623395 11,662181 11,690991 
14,024052 13,989945 13,953977 13,934486 13,90585 13,842387 
14,611612 14,653288 14,700263 14,760382 14,803308 14,837599 
15,482126 15,565596 15,651155 15,754365 15,870854 15,956671 
16,610874 16,61265 16,6 16,608852 16,615778 16,587572 
16,80232 16,85552 16,96935 17,090426 17,16038 17,192907 
17,087903 17,182244 17,2837 17,405401 17,528718 17,656435 
17,151767 17,198244 17,229473 17,266599 17,305131 17,30822 
17,761312 17,82747 17,885389 17,965025 18,043158 18,052823 
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23,476242 23,526154 23,596907 23,729112 23,870664 23,968336 
29,264648 29,247776 29,233191 29,25873 29,275003 29,233312 
47,418513 47,444397 47,481278 47,61118 47,747812 47,808081 
53,563694 54,420883 55,366683 56,0965 56,397156 56,608338 
70,013314 70,525703 71,138367 71,779063 72,267062 72,623986 
71,832565 72,338797 72,868519 73,488883 74,132169 74,626027 
74,926132 75,485469 75,965688 76,528054 77,081971 77,51711 
96 96 96 96 96 96 
Total Total Total Total Total Total 
691,114 694,131 697,339 700,882 703,757 705,538 
Source: own research. 
Taking the above into consideration, the boundary conditions set in this way make finding the allocation 
that would satisfy them all and in the described way be most similar to proportional representation 
impossible. So to maintain this idea of allocation it is imperative to either change the boundary 
conditions, or under current assumptions seek for the allocation, corresponding to the highest extent, with 
a set specific criterion, to the sequence of A(pi). Such a criterion may be, for example, to minimize the 
sum of squared errors i.e. the sum of  
(Aprop(p1) s1)2 + (Aprop(p2) s2)2 + ...+ (Aprop(pn) sn)2, 
where s1, s2, ..., sn is any, degressively proportional integer division with respect to the sequence 
p1, p2, ... , pn satisfying the conditions s1 = M, sn = m, s1 + s2 + ... + sn = H.  
Table 2. Square deviation of the allocation of selected proposals from the theoretical distribution generated by the function Aprop 
determined on the basis of population in 2010  
NAQ DIQ LFS SFS PUK RAM MIS 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0,010871 0,010871 0,0108706 0,010871 0,010871 0,010871 0,010871 
0,183212 0,183212 0,1832121 0,327146 0,183212 0,183212 0,183212 
1,042188 1,042188 0,0004358 0,000436 0,000436 0,000436 1,042188 
3,263515 3,263515 0,0374345 0,037434 0,037434 0,037434 0,650475 
4,020396 4,020396 2,593E-05 0,989841 2,59E-05 2,59E-05 1,010211 
9,785604 1,272824 0,7600441 0,760044 0,016434 0,760044 0,016434 
12,22323 0,246188 0,2538414 2,261495 0,246188 0,253841 0,253841 
12,15143 0,236089 0,2643089 2,292529 0,264309 0,264309 0,264309 
12,61869 0,305013 0,2004534 5,991334 0,200453 2,095894 0,200453 
13,62342 0,477469 0,0954865 5,331522 0,095486 1,713504 0,095486 
3,39439 0,024842 1,3400678 9,97052 1,340068 4,655294 4,655294 
3,37677 0,026374 1,3511759 10,00078 1,351176 1,351176 4,675978 
3,828563 0,001877 1,0885344 9,261848 1,088534 4,175191 4,175191 
2,520386 0,170097 1,9949519 11,64466 1,994952 5,819807 5,819807 
1,423028 0,037213 0,6513983 7,879768 0,651398 3,265583 3,265583 
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2,743777 0,430907 0,1180368 5,492296 0,118037 5,492296 1,805167 
1,711439 0,094999 2,8621202 13,62924 0,47856 7,245681 2,86212 
1,108436 1,108436 0,8971444 8,685853 0,897144 3,791499 0,897144 
1,06433 0,001003 4,1276581 9,190986 4,127658 9,190986 4,127658 
7,654565 3,121188 7,6545645 7,654565 7,654565 22,72132 7,654565 
84,49138 51,7237 17,572188 4,804511 38,33987 38,33987 51,7237 
153,5533 88,20331 29,070018 1,936723 19,28669 11,50337 54,63667 
337,6779 153,1657 40,653559 0,141387 54,40559 5,645444 40,65356 
337,6029 153,1152 40,627527 0,139856 54,37547 5,635746 19,13164 
341,6172 155,8225 71,959423 0,233183 55,99364 2,198963 2,198963 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total 
1352,691 618,105 223,775 118,669 243,152 136,352 212,010 
NAQ   natural quotas, DIQ  divisor quotas (Serafini, 2012), LFS -  large states favoring spline, SFS  small states favoring spline 
(Ramirez et al, 2012), RAM  (Ramirez et al, 2006), PUK  (Pukelsheim, 2007), MIS  (Misztal 2012b).  
Source: own research. 
It is evident that in this sense, the best proposition is the small states favoring spline division suggested 
by the Ramirez (Ramirez et al, 2012). Adopting the second idea i.e. the change in boundary conditions 
one can notice that the best solutions, with the current structure of population and keeping the total 
number of seats on the level  H = 751, is obtained for m = 8, M = 99. Then rounding down the sequence 
A(pi) for instance for the population in 2010 gives the sequence si to which s1 = M, sn = m and 
s1 + s2 + ... + sn = H. In fact it is not degressively proportional, but it meets the conditions of Cambridge 
Compromise. 
5. Conclusions 
The principle of degressive distribution of seats in the European Parliament contained in the Lisbon 
Treaty does not specify clearly the rules for allocation. There are plenty of solutions that meet the 
specified conditions, which allows for different interpretations, and consequently, political negotiations. 
To avoid this, objective, clear-cut solutions should be pursued. One way to achieve this goal is to use the 
Aprop function in the allocation. Then you can unambiguously, with the accuracy of rounding to integers, 
determine the distribution that meets the conditions for allocation of a fixed number of seats to the 
smallest and the largest Member State. You cannot guarantee, however, the allocation of a predetermined 
total number of seats. Therefore, the application of the allocation function Aprop can be twofold. Firstly, its 
values can serve as a reference for the evaluation of specific proposals for the allocation of seats, which 
are presented in Table 2. Secondly, one can search for such specific boundary conditions which, with the 
current demographic structure, would be satisfied with no exceptions by the Aprop allocation function. One 
of such solutions is to distribute 751 seats among 27 Member States in a way that the smallest would get 
8 and the largest 99 seats. It is just one of the proposals and that is why it seems that determining the 
appropriate boundary conditions is the key element in establishing the rules of degressive proportionality. 
Acknowledgements 
The work was supported by grant No:  N N111 553440 from the National Science Centre. 
82   Janusz Łyko /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  65 ( 2012 )  76 – 82 
References 
Florek J. (2012). A numerical method to determine a degressive proportional distribution of seats in the 
European Parliament. Mathematical Social Science, Elsevier, 63, 2, 121-129.  
Lamassoure, A., Severin, A. (2007). European Parliament Resolution on Proposal to amend the Treaty 
provisions concerning the composition of the European Parliament adopted on 11 October 2007 
(INI/2007/2169).  
Lamassoure A., Severin A. (2007). Report on the composition of the European Parliament. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2007-
0351+0+DOC+XML+V0//PL.   
Lasier J-F. (2012). Why not proportional? Mathematical Social Science. Elsevier. Vol. 63. Issue 2. Pp. 
90-93.  
yko J. (2012). Degressively proportional division of indivisible goods. Journal of Regional 
Development. Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies. Mendel University (to 
appear).  
yko J., Cegie ka K, Dniestrza ski P., Misztal A. (2010). Demographic changes and principles of the fair 
division. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies,Vol. 2, No 2, Pp.63-72.   
Misztal A. (2012a). Degresywna proporcjonalno a kszta towanie sk adu Parlamentu Europejskiego. 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wroc awiu.   
Misztal A. (2012b). Method of reverse recursion in context of allotment of seats in the European 
Parliament. Advances in Business-Related Scientific Research Conference (ABSRC 2012). Venice, Italia 
28-30 march 2012.   
Pukelsheim F. (2007). Putting Citizens First. Representation and Power In the European Union. In: 
Distribution of Power and Voting Procedures in the European Union. Warszawa: Proceedings of a 
Natolin International Workshop on Distribution of Power and Voting Procedures in the European Union.  
Ramirez González V., Martinez Aroza J., Márquez Garcia A. (2012). Spline methods for degressive 
proportionality in the composition of the European Parliament. Mathematical Social Science. Elsevier,  
63, 2, 114-120.  
Ramirez González V., Polomares A., Marquez M. (2006). Degressively Proportional Methods for the 
Allotment of the European Seats Amongst the UE Member States. In: Mathematics and Democracy. 
Berlin: Springer Verlag, 205-220.  
Serafini P. (2012). Allocation of the EU Parliament seats via integer linear programming and revised 
quotas. Mathematical Social Science. Elsevier, 63, 2, 107-113.  
S omczy ski W., yczkowski K. (2012). Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality. 
Mathematical Social Science. Elsevier, 63, 2, 94-101.   
The Treaty of Lisbon (2010). http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/ full_text/index_en.htm [Accessed: 
18.05.2010].  
Young H.P. (2003). Sprawiedliwy podzia . Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR. Warszawa. 
